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Chapter Six 
GOVERNMENT BY TRADE AGREEMENT 
by David A. Wirth* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1 
George Will published a column in which he criticized environmental elitists and 
others who would impede the "exhilaratingly unknowable future" ,2 catalyzed by 
that compact. Mr. Will notwithstanding, some of the less desirable aspects of the 
agreement were anything but "unknowable," and indeed quite predictable, at the 
time of the negotiation and the subsequent domestic implementation of the pact. 
Moreover, particularly with the benefit of hindsight, certain aspects of the agree-
ment are plainly anything but "exhilarating," especially from an environmental 
point of view. 
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to identify and analyze some of the unde-
sirable distortions in governmental processes resulting from NAFTA's negoti-
ation and domestic implementation -- an effect that might be described as "gov-
ernment by trade agreement." Second, the chapter suggests reforms that might 
mitigate or eliminate some of the more objectionable of these aspects without 
doing a disservice to the underlying goals and purposes of international trade 
• This work was supported by grants from the Creswell Foundation and the Frances 
Lewis Law Center of Washington and Lee University. Portions of this paper are based on 
the author's previously published work. 
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14 & 17, U.S. -Can. -Mex., 
reprinted in 32 /.L.M. 296, 612 (1993). 
2 Will, "Judicial Exhibitionism," Wash. Post, July 8, 1993, at A17. 
lll 
D. G. Dallmeyer ( ed.), Joining Together, Standing Apart: National Identities after NAFTA, 111-129. 
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agreements and that, indeed, might enhance their efficacy and legitimacy. In 
particular, the chapter identifies the following ways in which international trade 
agreements such as NAFTA, at least as currently structured, distort our national 
governmental processes: 
• by constraining governmental regulatory authority; 
• by subordinating multilateral environmental agreements to the interna-
tional trade regime; 
• by significantly reducing the opportunities for public participation in 
domestic lawmaking through the "fast track" process; 
• by precluding public access to dispute settlement panels constituted 
under international trade agreements; 
• by disrupting domestic federalism and federal-state relations; and 
• by adversely affecting the administrative process in matters of domes-
tic jurisdiction that fall within the scope of an international trade 
agreement. 
2. ENVIRONMENT AL REGULA TIO NS AS BARRIERS TO TRADE 
International trade agreements, at least to the extent that they govern national 
regulatory measures in the areas of environment and public health, contain 
primarily "negative" obligations. That is to say, international trade agreements 
do not generally contain affirmative requirements directing national governments 
to achieve certain minimum criteria in these areas. Rather, most obligations in 
trade agreements establish constraints on governmental actions -- the establish-
ment of tariffs, quotas, standards that discriminate between imported and domes-
tically manufactured goods, and the like. In other words, in international trade 
agreements governments generally promise to refrain from taking certain 
actions, as opposed to obligating themselves to undertake any affirmative steps. 
This approach arises from a view of liberalized trade as a situation of less, rather 
than greater, intervention by national governments in an international market in 
which, but for impediments in the form of national measures, goods would 
circulate freely. 
So, for instance, both NAFT A and the GATT Uruguay Round3 articulate so-
called "trade disciplines" designed to prevent the adoption of arbitrary or exces-
3 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negoti-
ations, 33 l.L.M. 9 (1994). 
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sive limitations on pesticides in food that could interfere with trade. 4 The trade 
disciplines contained in recent international trade agreements are intended to 
circumscribe the regulatory authority of national governments so as to limit the 
abuse of putative environmental or public health claims for protectionist pur-
poses, and not to establish minimum benchmarks for protection of the environ-
ment and public health. To that extent, these international trade agreements can 
be considered deregulatory instruments. 
By contrast, environmental protection anticipates affirmative, governmental-
ly-established requirements. Domestic and international environmental policies 
depend almost totally on governmental intervention in the marketplace to remedy 
market failures and to offset externalities. The trade and environment debate in 
large measure is a confrontation between these two central driving forces, both 
of which are intended to improve human welfare: one, environment, by encour-
aging greater governmental regulation; and the other, liberalized trade, by press-
ing toward less. If the balance is struck incorrectly, there is an obvious potential 
for trade agreements unduly to constrain domestic and international regulation to 
protect the environment and public health. 
One of the principal flash points in the trade and environment debate has been 
the potential for environmental measures to act as non-tariff barriers to trade; 
that is, the abuse of environmental or public health regulations to achieve trade-
related goals, such as preventing competition from foreign goods for protection-
ist purposes. The paradigm for the non-tariff barrier problem has been a ban 
imposed by the European Union (EU) on the use of growth hormones in beef, 
including imported meat. The United States, where these chemicals are per-
mitted, has strongly objected to the ban as a non-tariff barrier to trade because 
that measure supposedly is not supported by scientific evidence. 5 Attention from 
the trade point of view to environmental and public health measures as potential 
non-tariff barriers to trade has sparked a reciprocal concern from the environ-
mental side about the possibility that the net could be cast too widely, potentially 
exposing legitimate environmental, health and safety measures to attack from a 
trade perspective. 
4 See generally Wirth, "The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade 
Disciplines," 27 Cornell Int'[ L.J. 818 (1994). 
5 See generally Rothberg, Note, "From Beer to BST: Circumventing the GATT Standards 
Code's Prohibition on Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade," 75 Minn. L. Rev. 505 (1990); 
Froman, "Recent Developments, The United States-European Community Hormone Treated 
Beef Conflict," 30 Harv. /nt'l L.J. 549 (1989); Halpern, "The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef 
Controversy and the Standards Code: Implications for the Application of Health Regulations 
to Agricultural Trade," 14 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 135 (1989). 
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As it stands now, from the point of view of environmental and public health 
regulation, such as measures to protect the integrity of the food supply, the 
international trade regime is pretty much a no-win proposition. Consistent with 
the "negative" character of the obligations in international trade agreements, 
there are no mechanisms in NAFT A for assuring the implementation of mini-
mum governmental measures. Moreover, once those policies that do exist are 
subjected to trade-based scrutiny, nothing more than maintenance of the status 
quo can be expected to result even in the best possible case. The NAFT A disci-
plines must also be read against the background of a persistent tightening of 
trade-based constraints in this area under the 1947 GAIT. Only one of the envi-
ronmental, conservation, and public health measures examined by a GATT 
dispute settlement panel whose validity turned on the availability of the article 
XX exceptions in that instrument has withstood such scrutiny. 6 Moreover, there 
is little or no evidence that any of the NAFTA countries have abused regulatory 
measures designed to protect human health -- the area of greatest concern from 
the point of view of attenuation of domestic regulatory authority -- as opposed to 
that of animals or plants. 
Fortunately, this conflict between the "negative" obligations in trade agree-
ments and the affirmative governmental action required to assure environmental 
quality is not inevitable or irreconcilable. Trade agreements could very well 
articulate minimum environmental standards. In fact, there is even a theoretical 
underpinning for this approach that is entirely consistent with the underlying 
goals of these trade agreements. 
The failure to meet minimum environmental standards can be characterized 
from a trade point of view as an export subsidy that should be prohibited by, and 
actionable under, a trade regime. As it stands now, a nation's environmental 
policy is part of its inherent comparative advantage in international trade. The 
international trade regime creates incentives for exporting nations to relax: their 
environmental policies to lower the prices of their exported goods and 
consequently to improve their international competitiveness. While some might 
feel otherwise, it is at least arguable that lax environmental policies ought not be 
6 United States -- Taxes on Automobiles, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1399 (1994). But cf 
United States -- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 33 l.L.M. 842 (1994); United 
States -- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 39th 
Supp. at 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 l.L.M. 1594 (1991); Thailand -- Restrictions on Impor-
tation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 37th 
Supp. at 200 (1991), reprinted in 30 l.L.M. 1122 (1991); Canada -- Measures Affecting 
Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 
35th Supp. at 98 (1989); United States -- Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products 
from Canada, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 29th Supp. at 91 (1983). 
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encouraged in this manner and rewarded in the international marketplace. More-
over, this dynamic tends to discourage states from internalizing environmental 
costs rather than encouraging governments to take regulatory action to assure 
that the prices of manufactured goods reflect the environmental costs associated 
with them -- a maxim that is well-recognized at the international level as the 
Polluter-Pays Principle.7 Equating inadequate environmental policies with export 
subsidies changes the incentive structure by eliminating the benefits of "race to 
the bottom" and assures a level playing field for all exporting states. 8 
The actual text of NAFTA, however, contains only one provision that could 
even remotely be considered an affirmative environmental obligation: article 
1114, which very tepidly states that "[t]he Parties recognize that it is inappropri-
ate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental 
measures." Tellingly, this is one of the very few provisions of NAFTA that is 
expressly unenforceable through the ordinary panel dispute settlement process. 
By contrast, both the Uruguay Round and NAFTA contain affirmative, mini-
mum standards in the area of intellectual property that have been strongly advo-
cated by the United States. For example, the Uruguay Round requires a mini-
mum 20-year patent term from the date of application9 by contrast with previous 
U.S. law, which awarded a patent for 17 years from the date of issue. This 
provision, which was controversial both internationally and domestically, 10 
required a major change in domestic law effected through the Uruguay Round 
implementing legislation11 extending the term of U.S. patents. Although one 
might quibble about the extent to which environmental and public health regula-
tion is analogous to patent protection, the door has certainly been opened wide to 
the inclusion of affirmative, minimum obligations in international trade agreements. 
1 See, e.g., Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 16, adopted 
June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 
(1992); Recommendation on Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects 
of Environmental Policies, O.E.C.D. Doc. C(72)128, reprinted in Organisation for Econ-
omic Cooperation and Development, OECD and the Environment 23 (1986). 
8 See Wirth, "The International Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal States: 
How Close a Fit?" 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1389, 1398-1400 (1992). 
9 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, art. 33, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
10 See, e.g., "Members Urge Clinton Not to Include Patent Changes in Uruguay Round 
Bill," 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1201 (1994). 
11 Uruguay Round Agreements Acts. 532, Pub. L. No. 103--465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4835-36 
(1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. s. 154). 
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3. MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Another thorny issue is the relationship between multilateral environmental 
agreements containing trade measures and international trade agreements. Three 
principal examples are: 
• the Basel Convention on hazardous waste; 12 
• the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES); 13 and 
• the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 14 
The entire purpose of the first two of these agreements is to control trade in 
environmentally sensitive products, and the third utilizes trade measures as an 
affirmative vehicle to promote the goals of the agreement. 
To the extent that these agreements contain measures that are inconsistent 
with the requirements of trade agreements -- which they almost certainly do --
two GATT panel reports from 1991 and 1994 called their validity into question. 
To reduce the incidence of death and injury to dolphins snared in tuna fishing 
operations in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean, U.S. legislation known as the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 15 directs the Executive Branch to ban 
the importation of yellowfin tuna caught by vessels of foreign nations unless 
there has been a finding that the incidental take of marine mammals is compar-
able to that of United States vessels. Under the auspices of GATT, Mexico 
successfully challenged just such a ban on imports of yellowfin tuna from that 
12 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and Their Disposal, March 22, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), 
reprinted in 19 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 68 (1989), 21 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 3101, 281.L.M. 657 
(1989). 
13 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 
U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243, reprinted in A. Kiss, Selected Multi-
lateral Treaties in the Fiefa of the Environment 289 (1983), 21 Int'/ Env't Rep. (BNA) 2101, 
12 I.L.M. 1035 (1973). 
14 Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 47,515 (Dec. 
14, 1987), 17 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 256 (1987), 21 Int'/ Env't Rep. (BNA) 3151, 261.L.M. 
1550 (1987), adjusted and amended, June 29, 1990, S. Treaty Doc. No. 4, 102d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1 Y.B. Int'/ Envtl. L. 612 (1990), 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991), adjusted 
and amended, Nov. 25, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 9, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), 
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 875 (1993). 
15 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, s. 101(a)(2), 86 Stat. 
1027 (1972), 16 U.S.C. s. 1371(a)(2). 
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country. The three-member GATT dispute settlement panel concluded among 
other things that trade measures to protect resources outside the jurisdiction of a 
GATT party are not permissible. 16 A second successful challenge, initiated by 
the European Union and the Netherlands, addressed a secondary import ban 
designed to discourage "tuna laundering" by intermediary nations which pur-
chase yellowfin tuna abroad and export it to the United States and reached a 
similar conclusion. 17 
Article 104 of NAFT A grandfathers these three agreements by name, but 
requires consensus among NAFTA parties for inclusion of additional or future 
multilateral agreements. In effect, then, Mexico and Canada retain unilateral 
vetoes over future participation by the United States in multilateral environ-
mental agreements with inconsistent trade measures, even those whose parties 
are virtually universal. The treatment of these agreements in the GATT/World 
Trade Organization (WT0) system is still unresolved despite several years of 
debate. One likely possibility, however, is that the WTO will conclude that there 
is a necessity for a so-called "waiver" of the obligations contained in these 
agreements under article XXV of the 1947 GATT, which requires the affirm-
ative approval of two-thirds of the WTO member states. This situation raises the 
serious possibility that the obligations contained in the 1947 GATT might trump 
trade measures in an international environmental agreement, as is already the 
case with NAFTA. 
In addition, there is the very disturbing possibility that objections from the 
WTO Secretariat may prevent such measures from being adopted in the first 
place -- an approach that might be referred to as the "raised eyebrow." For 
example, during the negotiation of the Montreal Protocol, the GATT Secretariat 
was consulted about the consistency between the text of the proposed Protocol 
and that of the GATT. If the GA TT Secretariat had identified difficulties with 
the Protocol's text, those states that were more reluctant, as opposed to more 
16 United States -- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments 155 (39th Supp. 1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991). 
17 United States -- Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 842 (1994). 
Mexico did not seek the adoption of the first report at the time of its release. However, the 
GATT Council rejected a request by the European Union to adopt the report. See "GATT 
Council Refuses EC Request to Adopt Panel Report on U.S. Tuna Embargo," 9 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 353 (1992). In a discussion of the second report, the GATT Council is reported 
to have rejected a proposal from the United States that would have opened further Council 
meetings on that case to the public, and Mexico was said to consider requesting adoption of 
the first report. Williams, "GATT Shuts Door on Environmentalists," Financial Times 
(London), July 21, 1994, at 6. As of this writing, neither report has been adopted by the 
GATT Council and hence neither has yet acquired legal force. See Davey, "Dispute Settle-
ment in GATT," 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 51, 94 (1987). 
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enthusiastic, about reducing emissions of ozone-depleting chemicals would have 
gained a significant strategic advantage in the negotiations. Alternatively, the 
trade provisions, which are desirable if not essential contributions to the efficacy 
of that agreement, might have been excised altogether. 
Instead, international environmental agreements that meet certain criteria or 
have certain attributes ought to be deemed consistent with NAFT A or the 
GA TT. The legal vehicle for reaching this conclusion already exists in the form 
of article XX of the 194 7 GA TT text, which exempts certain public health, 
environmental, and conservation measures from the coverage of that agreement. 
The criteria employed to determine whether the article XX exceptions are sat-
isfied might include the number of parties to the agreement, the relationship of 
the trade measures to the goals of the agreement, the urgency of the environ-
mental problem, whether the agreement in question is potentially open to univer-
sal membership, and the like. 
4. DISTORTIONS FROM THE FAST TRACK PROCESS 
Trade agreements such as NAFT A can also disrupt our democratic processes on 
the national level. In some quarters, including what are commonly considered 
both "conservative" and "liberal" camps, there have been objections to obliga-
tions that constrain or limit governmental authority on the theory that they com-
promise U.S. sovereignty. This is incorrect, because trade agreements and inter-
national institutions created by them, such as the World Trade Organization, are 
established by a consensual process. Still, the prospect of some loss of freedom 
in national decision making, whether consensual or not, has been quite troubl-
ing. 
The domestic status of post-World War II trade agreements in domestic law is 
somewhat unusual. Congress has the exclusive authority under article I, section 
8 of the Constitution to regulate foreign trade. However, under article II, section 
2 the President also has the exclusive power to negotiate international agree-
ments with foreign sovereigns. Presumably to dovetail these two functions, after 
World War II the practice has arisen whereby Congress authorizes the President 
to negotiate trade agreements by prior statute, within certain broad parameters, 
on the condition that those agreements not enter into force until given effect by 
Congress through subsequent implementing legislation. Some have suggested 
that this "Congressional-Executive" process illegally bypasses the Constitutional 
requirement for the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of 
David A. Wirth 119 
treaties by a two-thirds majority, 18 but that appears to be a minority view. 
Regardless of the domestic implementation process, the negotiation of trade 
agreements such as NAFT A is clearly a lawmaking activity, on both the interna-
tional and national levels. Despite the importance of NAFTA's content both 
domestically and internationally, Representative Gephardt tellingly described the 
drafting process as "the most secretive trade negotiations that I have ever moni-
tored," 19 in which the Executive Branch had virtually sole control. The Execu-
tive Branch did not release interim texts of NAFTA. Indeed, when a document 
purporting to be a draft of the agreement was leaked to the press in late March 
1992, the Executive Branch would neither confirm nor deny the authenticity of 
that document. 20 
One important feature of the domestic process is that the implementing legis-
lation for NAFTA, the GATT Uruguay Round, and other recent trade agree-
ments is adopted under procedures commonly known as the "fast track." Under 
this procedure, once the implementing legislation is introduced, no amendments 
are permitted, contrary to ordinary procedure in the Congress. The reason for 
this is to prevent the Congress from, in effect, renegotiating or undermining the 
agreement by second-guessing the President's decisions in the negotiation on a 
case-by-case, individual basis. 
Nonetheless, there is a process that duplicates the normal legislative process 
to a certain extent. Under the fast track procedures, the text of the trade agree-
ment proper is publicly available before Congressional consideration of the 
domestic legislation for implementing that international instrument. Congress 
can, and in the case of NAFTA did, hold publicly accessible hearings on the 
agreement and, by implication, the legislation to implement it as a domestic legal 
matter. Members of Congress had access on a confidential basis to the draft bill 
18 See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard University, to Senator 
Robert Byrd (July 19, 1994), reprinted in Inside U.S. Trade, July 22, 1994, at 1 (arguing 
that "the legal regime put in place by the Uruguay Round represents a structural rearrange-
ment of state-federal relations of the sort that requires ratification by two thirds of the 
Senate as a Treaty"). 
19 Remarks of Representative Richard Gephardt Before the 21st Century Conference, 
Washington D.C. (Sept. 9, 1994), reprinted in Fed. News Service, Sept. 9, 1994 (available 
in LEXIS, News file). 
20 See "Citizen Groups Say Leaked NAFTA Draft Would Undermine U.S. Standards," 
Int'/ Trade Daily (BNA), Mar. 26, 1992. Although there was a dialogue with environmental 
organizations during the negotiation of the so-called "environmental side agreement" to 
NAFTA, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, 
U.S.-Can.-Mex., reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1482 (1993), interim drafts of that instrument also 
were not released to the public. In any event, the side agreement does not modify the basic 
NAFfA text. 
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and even participated in closed "non-markups" and "non-conferences" before it 
was formally introduced. 
Even so, the domestic implementing procedures exacerbated, rather than 
ameliorated, the lack of public access to the NAFT A negotiation process. The 
"non-markup" and "non-conference" processes are strictly closed to the public 
and in practice quite impenetrable. Certain Congressional committees have 
preferential access to this process. Moreover, the voluminous implementing 
legislation containing a large number of modifications to domestic U.S. laws was 
formally released to the public less than two weeks before the House of Repre-
sentatives voted on the bill on November 17, 1993. Even then, this documenta-
tion was not generally available as a practical matter until somewhat later. The 
Executive Branch released the final version of an environmental analysis of 
NAFT A to the public a scant four days before the House vote. 
Some have defended the fast track process as duplicating all the essential 
elements of our democratic procedures. 21 Whether or not that might be true in 
some cases, NAFTA certainly demonstrated the potential for the fast track 
approach significantly to disrupt the lawmaking process. The fast track process 
as a whole and the no-amendment rule in particular are purposely designed to 
affect numerous laws simultaneously and invite a particularly unprincipled sort 
of horse-trading among issues that would rarely be so closely linked in a typical 
legislative session, such as the health effects of pesticide residues and intellectual 
property. Add in the closed nature of the negotiating process, and one truly 
arrives at "government by trade agreement," characterized by an aggrandize-
ment of Executive prerogatives to a much greater extent than in any other area of 
domestic law. 
Even if the no-amendment rule were to be retained, there are significant 
opportunities for improving public access to both the negotiation and domestic 
implementation of future trade agreements. For instance, future legislation 
authorizing the negotiation of subsequent trade agreements might require that 
successive interim drafts of any such agreement be made available to the public. 
Although those procedures are specifically applicable to "treaties and interna-
tional conventions or agreements, "22 the National Environmental Policy Act's 
requirement for preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS)23 were 
21 See, e.g., Koh, "The Fast Track and United States Policy," 18 Brooklyn J. Int'[ L. 143 
(1992). 
22 40 C.F.R. s. 1508.18(b)(l). 
23 42 U.S.C. s. 4332(C). 
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held by the D.C. Circuit to be inapplicable to the negotiation of,24 and adoption 
of implementing legislation for, 25 NAFT A. Legislation specifically providing 
for the preparation of an EIS for future trade agreements at both stages would 
not only facilitate improved governmental decision making with respect to the 
environmental aspects of the agreement, but would also serve the larger salutary 
process of improving public participation in the formulation and implementation 
of the agreement and it implementing legislation. 
5. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
Another serious issue on both the domestic and international levels concerns 
public participation in dispute settlement under NAFT A and other trade agree-
ments. The history of the tuna dolphin dispute with Mexico in the GA TT, whose 
dispute settlement procedures are very similar to NAFTA's, is a good example 
of the need for reform in this area. 
As briefly discussed above, this dispute involved a provision of the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA),26 a statute enacted in 1972 and amended in 
major respects in 198427 and 1988,28 but never fully implemented by the 
Executive Branch. The statute in essence requires that the kill of dolphin by 
foreign fleets incidental to fishing for yellowfin tuna with "purse-seine" nets be 
commensurate with that of the United States fleet. The remedy for not meeting 
this standard is trade restrictions on imports of tuna from the offending country. 
The Earth Island Institute and the Marine Mammal Fund, two private nonprofit 
organizations, sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California under a theory of judicial review and obtained a court order direct-
ing the Executive Branch to carry out its nondiscretionary duties under the 
MMP A by imposing a ban on imports of yellowfin tuna from Mexico and other 
24 Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992). 
25 Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). 
26 16 U.S.C. s. 1371. The House of Representatives held four days of public hearings on 
the bill that subsequently became the MMPA. See H.R. Rep. No. 702, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4144, 4145. 
27 Pub. L. No. 98-364, s. 101, 98 Stat. 440 (1984). See H.R. Rep. No. 758, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 635, 639. 
28 Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, s. 4, 102 
Stat. 4755 (1984). See H.R. Rep. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-19 (1984), reprinted 
in 1988 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6154, 6155-59. 
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countries. 29 The Executive Branch then applied an administrative regulation30 
promulgated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 
located in the Department of Commerce, and adopted after publication of a 
proposed rule and an opportunity for public comment. 31 Relying on that regula-
tion, NOAA made a finding that Mexico had satisfied the statutory standard and 
lifted the import prohibition. Subsequently, the District Court issued a second 
order reaffirming the ban after concluding that the regulation was inconsistent 
with the MMPA and therefore illegal. On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both orders of the District Court. 32 
Mexico initiated a dispute settlement process in GATT, challenging the 
import ban as a non-tariff barrier to trade. In contrast to the opportunities for 
public input into the judicial fora in which this dispute was treated on the domes-
tic level, but consistent with standard GATT procedures, the documents and oral 
proceedings in the case were not accessible to the public. 33 Dispute settlement 
in GA TT does not provide for participation by private parties as intervenors or 
amici. The Earth Island Institute's lawyer, who had initiated the case at the 
domestic level, travelled to Geneva for the oral proceedings before the panel, but 
was compelled to wait in the corridor while the panel heard arguments from 
representatives of the governments of Mexico and the United States. 
In this proceeding, however, ten other GATT parties and the European Econ-
omic Community made written submissions to the panel, all of which were 
critical of the MMPA ban and most of which argued that that action is inconsist-
29 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), ajf'd, 929 
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). 
30 50 C.F.R. s. 216.24(e)(5)(iv)-(ix); 55 Fed. Reg. 11,929 (Mar. 30, 1990). 
31 NOAA initially published a proposed rule to implement the 1984 amendments on August 
13, 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,963 (Aug. 13, 1986). The comment period on this proposal was 
subsequently extended, in particular to give potentially affected foreign nations a full oppor-
tunity to comment. 51 Fed. Reg. 36,568 (Oct. 14, 1986). NOAA then published an interim 
final rule in 1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 8911 (Mar. 18, 1988). A second interim final rule with a 
request for comments, necessitated by the intervening amendments to the MMPA enacted in 
1988, was promulgated in 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 9438 (Mar. 7, 1989). The final regulation 
published in March 1990 reflected comments on the 1989 interim final rule. 
32 Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). 
33 See, e.g., Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and 
Surveillance, Annex para. 6(iv), Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, 26th Supp. at 
210 (1980) ("Written memoranda submitted to the panel have been considered confidential, 
but are made available to the parties to the dispute.") See also Decision on Improvements to 
the GA TT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, reprinted in Basic Instruments and 
Selected Documents, 36th Supp. at 61 (1990), reprinted in 281.L.M. 1031 (1989) (referenc-
ing suggested working procedures establishing that submissions of parties to panels confi-
dential and panel sessions closed). 
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ent with the GATT. No other contracting parties to the GATT sided with the 
United States. Further, the United States was represented in the GATT dispute 
settlement process by the Executive Branch, which had flouted three statutory 
directives, adopted an illegal regulation, and reluctantly implemented the import 
ban only under court order. Particularly against the background of the closed 
nature of the GATT process, questions as to whether the Executive Branch 
vigorously defended the validity of the ban naturally arose. The inaccessibility of 
the proceedings to members of the public strongly suggests that important per-
spectives were not adequately presented to the GATT dispute settlement panel, 
at least as a formal matter. Although the Executive Branch solicited some input 
from certain members of the public in the preparation of its submission, 34 those 
views at most affected only the United States submission to the panel, which in 
any event must reflect the Government's position. While helpful, that practice is 
not a substitute for opportunities for written and oral submissions directly to 
dispute settlement panel. 
In short, the many entry points for the public in implementing and adjudicat-
ing law on the national level are duplicated poorly if at all in the international 
trade regime. And, as more and more domestic regulatory issues are taken up in 
an international trade setting, example of these divergences will very likely 
increase in number and frequency. The Uruguay Round relaxes the confidential-
ity requirements for the dispute settlement process somewhat, 35 but NAFT A 
does not reflect this even this newly-established, although still unsatisfactory, 
"good practice standard. "36 Under both agreements, there is still a significant 
potential for the "removal" of a dispute from a domestic to an international 
forum in which the procedural and participatorial rights of interested private 
parties are attenuated or eliminated altogether. 
34 See Letter from Julius L. Katz, Deputy United States Trade Representative, to Justin 
Ward, Senior Resource Specialist, and Al Meyerhoff, Senior Attorney, Natural Resources 
Defense Council (Apr. 17, 1992). 
35 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes para. 
18.2, 33 I.L.M. 112 ("Written submissions to the panel or the [newly created] Appellate 
Body shall be treated as confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dis-
pute. Nothing in this Understanding shall preclude a party to a dispute from disclosing 
statement [sic] of its own positions to the public. Members shall treat as confidential, [sic] 
information submitted by another Member to the panel or the Appellate Body which that 
Member has designated as confidential. A party to a dispute shall also, upon request of a 
Member, provide a non-confidential summary of the information contained in its written 
submissions that could be disclosed to the public.") 
36 See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 1, art. 2012, para. l(b) ("The 
panel's hearings, deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and com-
munications with the panel shall be confidential.") 
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It would be entirely feasible to allow private parties to submit additional 
statements or arguments to dispute settlement panels in a capacity similar to that 
of amicus curiae in domestic law. If amicus status could be granted only after 
submission and approval of a written application, to which the states that are 
parties to the underlying case could respond, then the panel would have the 
authority to assure that there is no disruption to the orderly administration of 
justice. An application might be required to document the applicant's interest, 
the adequacy of representation of that interest by existing parties, the applicant's 
potential contribution to a satisfactory resolution of the dispute, the prejudice to 
the original parties if participation is permitted, and the scope of the proposed 
submission as amicus curiae. If the applicant is permitted to present a written 
submission, the panel could then decide the additional, distinct question of 
whether to hear the applicant during oral proceedings. Although as a matter of 
principle all written submissions to trade agreement dispute settlement panels 
ought to be available to the public, as a second-best alternative potential amici 
might be requested as a condition of participation to agree to keep documentation 
submitted by governments confidential. Such proposals, if implemented, can be 
expected substantially to improve public access to the trade agreement dispute 
settlement process without disrupting that process. 
6. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 
Another major structural issue is the effect of NAFT A, the WTO, and the 
Uruguay Round agreements on state and federal law. These agreements have not 
just the potential, but the strong likelihood, of disrupting federal-state relation-
ships by "federalizing" issues that were previously the prerogatives of the states. 
A report published in 1994 by the European Union37 emphasizes how much 
is at stake. That report explicitly targets a number of federal and state-level 
environmental and public health requirements as non-tariff barriers to trade. Of 
particular concern are state laws that may have more stringent environmental 
and public health standards than federal statutes or regulations. Presumably as a 
consequence, during the debate over the Uruguay Round implementing legisla-
tion 44 state attorneys general wrote to the President requesting what they 
described as a summit meeting on this issue. 38 
Because of concerns such as these, the NAFT A implementing legislation 
37 European Union, Report On United States Barriers To Trade And Investment (1994). 
38 "State Groups, Lawmakers Oppose Pre-Emption Of State Law Under GATT," 11 Int'l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1136 (1994). 
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established a federal-state consultation process in the event of a challenge by one 
of the other NAFT A parties to the law of a state or any of its political subdivi-
sions. 39 Ultimately, however, the NAFTA implementing legislation, like that 
for other trade agreements before it, preserves judicial remedies for federal 
authorities to sue state governments to compel compliance with trade agreements 
and actions taken under them. 40 Of course, in a federal state like the United 
States, there must be a mechanism to assure that subsidiary governmental units 
such as the states in the United States and the provinces in Canada observe inter-
national law. However, the real question is the form of that mechanism, consist-
ent with our notions of federalism and preemption. In the pesticide area, for 
instance, the states may take certain actions that are more stringent than provided 
in federal law. 41 
An entirely viable alternative to allowing the Executive Branch to extinguish 
these rights by judicial action would be to preserve the full autonomy of subsidi-
ary governmental units after the agreement enters into effect. Then, if a problem 
were to arise concerning implementation at the state or local level, the Executive 
Branch could negotiate with those bodies. If those negotiations were to fail, 
special legislation preempting the rights of the state in question on a particular 
issue could be adopted by Congress, specially tailored to that problem situation. 
This is yet another area in which trade agreements unnecessarily serve as a 
vehicle for the expansion of Executive Branch power, in this case at the expense 
of the states. The inclusion of the Congress in the implementation process is 
highly desirable an additional forum in which to debate the merits of any adverse 
dispute settlement panel report and the form of compliance by the United States. 
Otherwise, we may have no way of even knowing what we are giving up at the 
sub-national level if virtually any state or local law, regulation, or ordinance can 
be "federalized" through the avenue of a trade agreement -- again, "government 
by trade agreement." 
7. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Trade agreements may also disrupt administrative processes and law at the feder-
al level. Contrary to the assertions of some, it is well established that adverse 
39 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. 103-182, s. 
lOl{b)(l), 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). 
40 Id. s. lOl(b)(l). 
41 See, e.g., Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991); Coparr, Ltd. v. 
City of Boulder, 942 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991). 
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reports of GATT dispute settlement panels cannot repeal federal statutes. But as 
any student of administrative law will attest, statutory law is but one component 
of the regulatory process. Most federal environmental statutes require subse-
quent implementation through administrative rulemaking or other unilateral 
Executive Branch action. In this realm of purely Executive prerogative, there 
may be little or nothing to keep the Executive from unilaterally relaxing a do-
mestic standard in response to an adverse panel report. And because of the "neg-
ative" character of trade agreements, the change will always have a weakening 
effect on the rigor of domestic regulatory requirements. 
An excellent example of precisely this phenomenon has recently occurred. 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 42 the Environmental Protection Agency in early 
1994 promulgated rules concerning "reformulated" gasoline, which reduces 
ground-level ozone in highly polluted areas. 43 Those regulations establish stan-
dards for reformulated gasoline as measured against a baseline, the calculation of 
which is specified in the rules. Domestic refiners are permitted to choose among 
three methods of calculating this baseline. For reasons related to differences 
between imported and domestically produced gasoline, however, fewer options 
are available for establishing the baseline in the case of gasoline produced at 
foreign refineries. The Venezuelan national oil company protested that the EPA 
rules discriminate against imported gasoline in contravention of the GATT. 
Subsequently, EPA in May 1994 published a proposed amendment to its 
reformulated gasoline regulations to address these complaints. 44 Congress in an 
appropriations measure subsequently prohibited EPA from finalizing the pro-
posed rule, 45 and Venezuela's challenge to the reformulated gasoline regula-
tions will be the subject of the first dispute settlement panel established under the 
auspices of the WTO. 46 
Entirely apart from the effect ofEPA's proposed amendment on air quality in 
the United States and the merits of Venezuela's challenge in the WTO, both of 
which are complex, this situation is revealing for its impact on domestic admin-
istrative processes. In such a situation, there is every reason to believe that back-
channel negotiations with foreign governments might subvert the integrity of the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process and could serve as an invitation to 
circumvent statutory standards. The House Committee on Energy and Com-
42 42 U.S.C. s. 7545(k). 
43 50 C.F.R. s. 80.91-.93; 59 Fed. Reg. 7791 (Feb. 16, 1994). 
44 59 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (May 3, 1994). 
45 Pub. L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 2299, 2322 (1994). 
46 See Frances Williams, "WTO Sets Up First Disputes Panel," Financial Times (London), 
Apr. 11, 1995, at 6. 
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merce, which held hearings on this matter, articulated precisely this concern by 
observing that "the State Department had made commitments regarding the rule 
to the Venezuelans which made the public participation requirements of the 
[Clean Air Act] ineffective. "47 
In such a case, the courts and the institution of judicial review may provide 
the only meaningful remedy to assure that the Executive Branch satisfies domes-
tic statutory criteria, both substantive and procedural. However, in federal court 
an issue like the reformulated gasoline rule appears not just as an ordinary regu-
lation in a garden-variety proceeding for judicial review, but also as a foreign 
relations issue. As anyone who has worked in this area will confirm, the courts 
are much more deferential to the Executive Branch in a foreign relations setting. 
In fact, in subsequent judicial proceedings in the tuna dolphin controversy con-
cerning the secondary import ban from tuna processed in intermediary nations, 
the Executive Branch did not hesitate to emphasize the potential harm to foreign 
relations if the court were to rule against the Government. 48 
An earlier series of judicial proceedings clearly demonstrates the potential for 
difficulties when questions of statutory interpretation and the integrity of agency 
regulatory process appear in a foreign relations context. In the mid-1980s EPA, 
acting on evidence that the fumigant ethylene dibromide (EDB) causes cancer, 
genetic mutations, and adverse reproductive effects in human beings, banned 
that pesticide for use on domestic produce. By contrast, in response to assertions 
from the Department of State that the ban would damage the economies of 
friendly exporting countries, EPA promulgated a tolerance permitting that con-
tinued to allow residues of 30 parts per billion (ppb) of EDB in imported 
mangoes. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit set aside the tolerance, concluding that because EPA was required by statute 
to base pesticide residue limitations on health considerations, the agency's reli-
47 R.R. Rep. No. 882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in 1995 WL 14808 at 
*647-48 (available in Legislative History database). 
48 While the (Executive Branch] did not argue that the court was legally bound by the 
Panel's decision in interpreting the intermediary embargo nation provisions of the MMPA, 
the government did go to great lengths to make the court aware of the Panel's decision. 
Implicit in this effort to present the court with the Panel's decision was the notion that the 
court should be aware of, and consider in its decision, the effects of its decision on foreign 
trade relations. The United States pointed to the Panel's decision as evidence of the substan-
tial friction that could result from a more stringent reading of the intermediary nations 
embargo provisions of the MMPA. R.F. Housman and D. J. Zaelke, "The Collision of the 
Environment and Trade: The GATT Tuna/Dolphin Decision," 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10,268 (1992). 
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ance solely on concerns of foreign affairs was illegal. 49 
On remand, EPA reaffirmed the residue limitation for imported mangoes, but 
came up with new justifications for that tolerance. The Agency concluded that 
the special exemption was warranted by ongoing cooperative efforts with food-
exporting nations to assure that fruit and vegetables enter the United States free 
of pests like the Mediterranean fruitfly, diseases, and unsafe levels of pesticides. 
Moreover, mango-producing nations were channelling export revenues into the 
search for alternatives for EDB. Accordingly, EPA concluded that revoking the 
EDB tolerance and prohibiting the importation of contaminated mangoes into the 
United States would pose greater risks to the food supply than continuing to 
allow the entry of the pesticide-laced produce. To put it kindly, this reasoning is 
counterintuitive. Nonetheless, after EPA provided assurances with respect to the 
limited term of the standard for imported mangoes, the Court of Appeals, ac-
cepting this rationalization, approved the very same tolerance that that court had 
earlier set aside as a violation of the statutory standard.50 Although the D.C. · 
Circuit's second review of the mango tolerance was phrased as a pure question 
of statutory interpretation of the health-based standard in the governing statute, 
the court could hardly have been deaf to the Government's clear assertions of 
harm to foreign relations. 
As in the case of state laws, this "internationalization" of federal law is not a 
healthy thing for democratic decision making processes. Moreover, this situation 
could easily be corrected by an express statement in the domestic implementing 
legislation establishing that the conclusions of dispute settlement panel reports 
shall be without legal effect in administrative or judicial proceedings. Without 
such guarantees, there is a significant likelihood that the Executive Branch can 
act unilaterally with few if any restrictions, either from the legislative or judicial 
branches, in areas of domestic jurisdiction that happen to fall within the purview 
of international trade agreements -- again, "government by trade agreement." 
The proposed reform, moreover, is entirely consistent with the principle that 
dispute settlement panel reports have no domestic legal effect. Of course, Con-
gress could still act to overturn a regulation that did not conform to the expecta-
tions of a dispute settlement panel constituted under an international trade agree-
ment. That check, however, is highly desirable to assure multi-branch action on 
behalf of the United States Government and to guarantee adequate public access 
49 Nat'l Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
50 Nat'l Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 815 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
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to domestic decision making processes in areas affected by the actions of multi-
lateral trade bodies. 
8. CONCLUSION 
This chapter is not an argument against NAFT A or international trade agree-
ments more generally. Instead, it is a plea for a sense of proportion or perspec-
tive concerning the importance of liberalized trade by comparison with other 
social welfare concerns, such as environment and public health. Significantly, 
every one of the problems identified here can be solved, or at least ameliorated, 
through sound choices in negotiating future trade agreements and in drafting 
their implementing legislation. In that regard, we would be wise to continue to 
heed the words of Benjamin Disraeli who, more than a century and a half ago, 
remarked that "[f]ree trade is not a principle; it is an expedient. " 51 That obser-
vation is as valid today as it was then. 
51 Speech on Import Duties (Apr. 25, 1843). 
